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ensure the Forest Practice Act’s policy for sustainable forestry. In 2018 Mr. Wilson created the non-
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I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly one-third of California is forested, with 33 million acres of
private and state forestlands.3  These forests provide critical resources for
our state, and most particularly source at least 60% or more of our neces-
sary water supply.4  California’s forest resources and timberlands “are
among the most valuable of the natural resources of the state.”5  Histori-
cally, California’s Department of Forestry and Fire Protections
(“CalFire”) has been charged with protecting these resources, with a two-
fold mission: (1) the protection of commercial timber on all nonfederal
lands from improper logging activities and (2) the protection of water-
sheds from wildland fire in lands identified as part of the State Responsi-
bility Area (“SRA”).6
CalFire is required to protect California’s forests and their re-
sources, by  governing private-land logging to ensure that forest produc-
tivity “is restored, enhanced, and maintained” and to achieve “maximum
sustained production of high quality timber products” for this and future
generations.7  California’s Forest Practice Act was created and is in-
tended to ensure healthy forests with protection of their environmental,
economic, and community resources.  Protection of California’s forest
natural resources is the only way productivity of high-quality wood prod-
ucts can be achieved.  That has not happened. Instead, today many of
California’s forests are in “an unhealthy condition,” with increased forest
density containing more small trees, fewer large trees, and more dead
trees, creating intensified and devastating wildfire conditions.8
CalFire carries an increasingly immense responsibility as a premier
fire-fighting agency, top-ranked in the world.  Every year, the demand to
contain and stop devastating fires throughout our state increases.  Fire
prevention efforts have driven the agency’s financial budget, whereas
forest resource management has been captive to politics largely driven by
industrial timberland owners.  Each year the budget for fire prevention
increases exponentially to respond to the expanding demand to fight cat-
astrophic fires during longer designated fire seasons.  CalFire’s failure to
adequately govern private-land logging has created conditions which
contribute to increased fire risk, resulting in a growing disparity favoring
3 Mac Taylor, Improving California’s Forest and Watershed Management 1 (2018).
4 Id. at 3.
5 Pub. Res. Code § 4512(a).
6 Taylor, supra note 3, at 8-9.
7 Pub. Res. Code §§ 4512, 4513.
8 Legislative Analyst’s Office, Improving California’s Forest and Watershed Management 1
(2019); see Taylor, supra note 3, at 18-22.
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funding for fire suppression rather than resource management
governance.
California now has a damaging gap in the governance of its forests.
California’s core sustainable forest management program — intended to
ensure healthy forests and thus prevent fire prone conditions — has been
relegated to ineffectiveness.  CalFire’s lack of governance has resulted in
fire-prone conditions: forests with smaller and smaller trees, increasingly
dense stands of trees, and reduced overall health and lack of biodiversity.
These conditions have now converged to create disastrous conflagration.
Rather than CalFire securing the foundation to govern logging to attain
healthy forests, California is now forced to fix damaged forests at signifi-
cant public cost.  The failure to fulfill the promise of California’s Forest
Practice Act, coupled with insufficient agency resources, defeats Califor-
nia’s commitment to ensure healthy forests for this and future
generations.9
It is time to remove governance of California’s core sustainable for-
est management mandate from CalFire to allow it to focus on its over-
whelming fire agency obligations.  In the absence of adequate and
dedicated funding and resource personnel, CalFire is not satisfying Cali-
fornia’s forest resource management goals and objectives.  After decades
of decline, California must renew its fundamental commitment to sus-
tainable forest management.  The governance of forest resource manage-
ment requirements, as set forth in the Z’Berg Nejedly Forest Practice Act
of 1973,10 should be transferred to another agency, the focus of which is
resource and land conservation.  California needs one dedicated and ade-
quately funded agency with professionally trained staff who understand
the complexity and interrelationships within the entire forest system, its
productivity, and all of its resources.  This different agency would be
required and accountable to secure California’s commitment in gov-
erning forest resource management.  An agency like this would be able
to ensure that our forests are restored, enhanced, and maintained to pro-
tect the environmental, economic, and social resources that healthy for-
ests provide.  An independent agency dedicated to governing forest
resource management and land conservation is more critical than ever as
California faces and attempts to respond to the irrefutable climate crisis.
Our forests must be increasingly available to provide enhanced carbon
sequestration for the survival of this and future generations.  Such a sepa-
ration enables healthy forests and leaves CalFire to do its excellent fire-
fighting work.
9 Pub. Res. Code § 4512 (c).
10 Pub. Res. Code § 4511.
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II. WHY FORESTS MATTER UNDER CALIFORNIA’S FOREST PRACTICE
ACT
Forests act as the lungs of our planet, providing many functions of
life in a highly complex natural system.  “A forest is not merely a collec-
tion of trees . . . [it is] an ecosystem – the interlocking conditions that at
any one time sustain a specific set of biological diversity.”11  As an
ecosystem, forests provide critical air, wildlife, climate, and recreational
benefits, in addition to sourcing the watersheds that serve California’s
water needs.12  Healthy forests store carbon, a function which is increas-
ingly critical in our efforts to reduce the catastrophic effects of climate
change and greenhouse gases (“GHG”).13  A productive forest is one
which maintains and protects all of these values.
Our current Forest Practice Act, the “Z’Berg Nejedly Forest Prac-
tice Act of 1973” (“Forest Practice Act”),14 was created in the context of
conditions at the time.  There existed an
increasingly rapid depletion of raw timber volumes on the 8 million or
so acres of commercial timberland in the State of California . . . [and]
the most serious facts and figures regarding the rapid depletion of our
forests in California, [and] the effects this will have on employment,
the economy, and the environment . . .The conclusion is obvious that
severe economic and employment dislocation are just around the cor-
ner for communities dependent upon the lumber industry . . .15
To remedy this rapid depletion of our forests, the Forest Practice Act was
created to ensure that our forests would be “restored, enhanced and
maintained.”16
California created the Forest Practice Act in 1973, promising to pro-
vide healthy forests “for this and future generations.”17  It governs the
forest resource management of nearly 13 million private forestland
acres.18  CalFire is responsible for implementing the Forest Practice Act
and providing the required governance.19  Since 1973, California has ex-
11 Richard R. Terzian et al., Little Hoover Commission, Timber Harvest Plans: A Flawed
Effort to Balance Economic & Environmental Needs 126, at 13 (1994).
12 Taylor, supra note 3, at 1.
13 Forest Climate Action Team, California Forest Carbon Plan: Managing Our Forest Land-
scapes in a Changing Climate 112 (2018).
14 Statutes 1973, c. 880, p. 1614, § 4; Pub. Res. Code § 4511.
15 Assemblyman Edwin L. Z’Berg, Press Conference Release, Feb. 1, 1973.
16 Pub. Res. Code § 4513(a).
17 Pub. Res. Code § 4512(c).
18 Taylor, supra note 3, at 5.
19 Pub. Res. Code § 4581.
4
Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj/vol12/iss1/2
2020] WHY IT IS TIME FOR A CALFIRE DIVORCE 5
pressly required CalFire to govern sustainable forest practices — to
achieve  “maximum sustained production of high quality wood prod-
ucts,” while protecting a suite of environmental and societal resources,
such as water supply and quality, fisheries, wildlife, range and forage,
aesthetics, and recreation.  Since 1973, California has also identified se-
questration of carbon dioxide, regional economic vitality, and employ-
ment as resources commanding protection.20
Growing mature, healthy trees depends on many variables, includ-
ing natural conditions, productivity of the forest soils, and stressors like
elevation, geology, soil types, climate, and weather.21  Recognizing this,
the Forest Practice Act’s requirement to provide “high quality wood
products” underscores the imperative to have wood from mature healthy
trees.  Mature trees are measured by their highest average volume growth
rate: when they have reached their “culmination of mean annual incre-
ment” (“CMAI”).  Mean annual increment (“MAI”) “measures the aver-
age productivity of a stand over its lifetime; [t]he age at which MAI is
max is called the Culmination of MAI (“CMAI”) [or] optimal biological
rotation age.”22  CMAI for redwoods, for example, does not occur until
after age 100.23  For wood quality, this means mature trees which pro-
duce tight grain lumber, with a much higher density in growth rings per
radial inch.  This can be seen by looking at the cut end of any 2 x 4, to
count the rings per radial inch.  Less dense wood from immature trees,
with fewer than 7 rings per radial inch, is not as capable to withstand
stresses, not just from construction but certainly from events like earth-
quakes, tornadoes and hurricanes.24  Thus, a main point of the Forest
Practice Act is to require the growing of larger and older trees on key
parts of the forest, to secure the maximum sustained resource production
California has promised.
This consistent supply of high quality wood products also depends
on a balanced distribution of trees of different age classes, so that there
are always young trees growing to maturity and mature trees are availa-
ble for harvest.25  In developing the Forest Practice Act, the legislature
recognized that “encouraging development of a more normal distribution
20 Pub. Res. Code § 4513(b); 58 Ops. Cal. Atty Gen. 250 (1975).
21 Richard Wilson et al., Putting Forest Health into Context, WHYFORESTSMATTER.ORG (May
1, 2019), www.whyforestsmatter.org/thought-leadership/2019/5/1/putting-forest-health-into-context.
22 Growth and Yield, WASHINGTON.EDU, https://faculty.washington.edu/toths/ESRM461/Lec
tures/Week5_Lecture1.pdf (Apr. 27, 2017).
23 Russell M. Burns, Silvicultural Systems for the Major Forest Types of the United States 39
(1983).
24 Wilson, R., Letter to Dr. J. Keith Gilless, Nov. 6, 2015 (on file with author).
25 Inst. of Ecology Univ. Cal. Davis, Public Policy for California Forest Lands 80 (Apr. 1972)
(prepared for the Assembly Committee on Natural Resources and Conservation).
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of timber age classes” was key.26  Without this distribution of a trees
with different ages classes, “it is practically and theoretically impossible
to manage [forests] currently for perpetual sustained yield. . .”27
Jackson Demonstration State Forest (“Jackson”), a publicly owned
50,000-acre forest located in Mendocino County, is one model of a
healthy California forest.  California has created eight demonstration for-
ests, including Jackson, to restore badly cutover timberland and provide
fully productive working forests.28  Cutover timberland exists when log-
ging has removed, most if not all, of the trees, with consequential ad-
verse effects on the overall forest landscape and its resources.
Demonstration forests provide working forests which “[r]etain the ex-
isting land base of state forests in timber production for research and
demonstration purposes.”29
California purchased Jackson after it had been logged intensively
and was badly cutover.  After its creation in 1949, California effectively
left the forestland alone for decades with minimal management to en-
courage the regrowth of the forest.  It then began limited logging using
management techniques to continue to restore the land to a healthy pro-
ductive forest, capable of providing high quality wood product and pro-
tecting the forest’s natural resources.  This forest has proven that it can
recover to a highly productive state.  Over time, Jackson has produced a
sustainable harvest of high-quality mature trees and significant revenue
for the State.30  Jackson provides a working landscape for jobs and sus-
tainability over time by restoring and maintaining all forest resources and
community life.  Jackson protects the State’s interest by providing a
healthy forest ecosystem, which sustainably provides high quality wood
product.  As a healthy forest, Jackson also supports healthy populations
of animal and plant species and can be essential to prevent extinction of
endangered and threated species, such as our salmonid fish.
Moreover, this healthy forest has an increased ability to sequester
carbon and remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.  The Forest
Practice Act requires that not only must the public’s need for carbon
sequestration be protected in any given logging plan,31 but also,  because
“[t]here is increasing evidence that climate change has and will continue
26 Id. at 81.
27 Id. at 84.
28 Pub. Res. Code § 4631.
29 Pub. Res. Code § 4631.5(a).
30 For example, in 2019, California noticed a timber sale for 737 acres in Jackson, with an
estimated timber value of $1,632,000; Chamberlain Confluence 2019 Timber Sale.
31 Pub. Res. Code § 4512 (c).
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to stress forest ecosystems,” California forests must be proactively man-
aged to sequester carbon and adapt to the stressors of the climate crisis.32
While Jackson stands out as what good management can achieve, it
does not represent what exists on private timberlands.  Today, CalFire’s
governance of private forest land has failed to protect these same values
as provided by Jackson.  Now, primarily because of intense fire prone
conditions requiring most of CalFire’s budget, CalFire is increasingly
unable to do its job.
III. THE STATUS OF CALFIRE’S GOVERNANCE OF CALIFORNIA’S
PRIVATE FORESTS TODAY
Since 1973, California’s core promise to attain healthy forests has
not been fulfilled.  Instead, we have seen a decline in overall forest man-
agement, culminating today in a situation much like in 1973 — depletion
of forests with high quality wood product, logging of trees with smaller
and smaller diameters, reduction in our water supply and fisheries, and
the loss of community-based forestry.  Repeated and intensive harvesting
of private forestlands in California, with shorter and shorter rotations,
cutting trees that do not reach CMAI, has reduced their overall produc-
tivity.  Practices that reduce the rotation time and increase the cutting of
trees that have not reached CMAI eliminates California’s ability to pro-
tect not only the ongoing supply of high quality wood products, but
equally all of the resource values dictated under the Forest Practice
Act.33  Much private industrial forest land is now reduced to unhealthy
monocultures, which create dense vegetative masses highly vulnerable to
fire and less capable of holding water than a multi-stage forest, sequester
less carbon, provide little habitat for diverse species, produce inferior
wood, and undermine local economies.34  It is widely recognized that our
forests are in poor condition, resulting in devastating fire-prone condi-
tions demanding millions of dollars each year in fire suppression as well
as expensive forest health initiatives to restore poorly-managed forests.35
As a result, the core governing mandate for sustainable forest manage-
ment — the governance which exists to provide healthy forests through
32 Pub. Res. Code § 4512.5.
33 Pub. Res. Code §§ 4512, 4512.5, 4513.
34 Richard Wilson et al., Program Overview, WHYFORESTSMATTER.ORG, www.whyforestsmat-
ter.org/our-programs-1.
35 Taylor, supra note 3, at 1; Loretta Moreno et al., Monitoring and Assessment of Califor-
nia’s Timberland Ecosystems Under Assembly Bill 1492 and the Timber Regulation and Forest
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sound forest practice management — is diluted to a fraction of CalFire’s
agency focus and funding.
CalFire’s lack of governance of private land logging has facilitated
poor forest conditions throughout our state, with increasingly smaller
trees instead of larger and older trees in a distribution of age classes,
which protect soil and water resources.  The mandate for sustainable pro-
duction of high-quality wood products with protection of the environ-
ment and local economies has become almost an afterthought.  Small
timberland owners36 and their communities are directly impacted.  They
hold at least one half of the privately owned forestland in California.37
Increasingly, they are not able to compete, particularly because local
mills have closed, and the transportation and regulatory costs of logging
have dramatically increased.  Even if they are able to manage for larger
and older trees, they are not able to be readily milled for lumber.  Most
industry sawmills are no longer equipped to handle larger, higher quality
logs.  Modernized mills generally handle logs from 6 to 16 inches in
diameter, well below the average 40-80” log from more mature trees.38
The smaller logs which sawmills are processing are not from older and
mature trees capable of providing high quality wood product.
The above conditions have necessarily required California to dedi-
cate immense resources to fight fires, at an enormous risk to communi-
ties and costs to the taxpayers.  Instead of focusing on fire prevention
through effective governance of forest management actions, California is
left to spend significantly more money and resources on fire suppres-
sion.39  While this fire-fighting effort is now imperative, the lack of ade-
quate funding and commitment for proactive governance to ensure that
healthy forests exist and are maintained deepens the continuation of un-
healthy forests and increasing wildfire risks and occurrences.
36 While the Forest Practice Act and its regulations reference small land owners in various
places, the term “small timberland owner” is given specific definition in only two places: (1) the
“Small Timberland Owner Exemption,” for ownerships of no more than 60 acres in the Coast Dis-
trict, or 100 acres inland, Pub. Res. Code § 4584 (j)(1)(H), (I); and (2) the “small nonindustrial
timberland owner” for the “Program Timberland EIR for Carbon Sequestration and Fuel Reduction
Program, for ownerships of 5000 acres or less,. Pub. Res. Code § 4598.3(d). Other categories of
small timberland owners may include: (1) a non-industrial timberland owner with less than 2,500
acres, Pub. Res. Code § 4593.2; (2) a working forest timberland owner with less than 10,000 acres,
Pub. Res. Code § 4597.1(i); or (3) a qualifying timberland owner under the California Forest Im-
provement Program with no more than 5,000 acres of forestland in California, www.fire.ca.gov/
media/10265/2019-12-05-users-guide.pdf.
37 Taylor, supra note 3, at 4-5.
38 Wilson, supra note 21.
39 Taylor, supra note 3, at 17.
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IV. CALFIRE’S FUNDING STATUS IS FIRE FOCUSED
According to a 2009 Legislative Analyst Office report, it is without
question that CalFire’s “core mission” is fighting wildland fires, and with
the passage of time, the “costs of expanding the mission of CalFire — a
phenomenon often referred to as mission creep — are significant.”40
The cost of this “mission creep” is the deterioration of our private forest
lands, due to a lack of governance to ensure compliance with the Forest
Practice Act requirements for forest management.
According to the 2018 LAO Report, “fire response spending, which
grew from $650 million in 1998-99 (adjusted for inflation) to more than
$2.3 billion in 2017-18, makes up over 90 percent of the department’s
annual spending.  In contrast, spending on proactive activities like re-
sources management and fire prevention remain relatively flat over the
period, averaging $77 million and 7 percent of the department’s total
expenditures through 2013-14.”41
The proposed FY 2020-21 budget continues the funding disparity
between CalFire’s governance of resource management and its fire re-
sponsibilities, allocating over 86% ($2.224 billion) of the CalFire’s
budget to fire protection, with slightly more than 11% ($289,222 million)
to resource management.42  This means nearly a 9% reduction in funding
for resource management, down from $306,381 million in 2019.43  The
proposed budget for fire-fighting adds 131 permanent new positions to
an existing force of about 6,000 fire fighters, with authority to hire hun-
dreds of temporary people for the season, and 13 more fire engines.44  In
addition, the budget proposes to hire 677 more firefighters over the next
five years, and “sets aside $120 million more next year and $150 million
per year moving forward to staff engines more robustly and improve
readiness in other ways.”45
40 Legislative Analyst’s Office, CalFire General Fund Reductions and Deferrals,
LAO.CA.GOV, https://lao.ca.gov/analysis_2009/resources/res_anl09003005.aspx.
41 Taylor, supra note 3, at 16-17.
42 California’s 2020-21 Governor’s Budget, 3540 Department of Forestry and Fire Protec-
tion, EBUDGET.CA.GOV, http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/budget/2020-21/#/Department/3540 (Jan. 10,
2020).
43 Id.
44 Andrew Sheeler, California Governor’s Budget Calls for Hundreds More Firefighters. ‘It’s
About Damn Time,’ Sacramento Bee, Jan. 10, 2020.
45 Id.
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V. WHY CALIFORNIA NEEDS A SEPARATE STATE AGENCY TO
GOVERN LOGGING ON PRIVATE LANDS
There are several well-documented management reasons why Cali-
fornia today has severely fire prone forests, rather than healthy forests
resistant to fire as a result of proper resource governance.  The key rea-
sons are: (1) lack of agency resources (as described above), (2) failure to
prioritize sustainable healthy forests as the outcome, (3) lack of adequate
standards to understand and prevent cumulative impacts, and (4) a lack
of training.  Read properly, the Forest Practice Act requires an under-
standing of forests as whole ecosystems, with governance that protects
all forest resources, rather than limiting trees as purely economic com-
modities.  CalFire has not satisfied this requirement in its governance of
logging plans for the above cited reasons.  Documented by historical re-
ports and professional opinion, failure to implement responsive legisla-
tion, and CalFire’s current day regulatory approach, it clear that CalFire
is not capable to provide the governance to ensure healthy forests which
provide high quality wood products and protect the environment, particu-
larly in the expanding climate crisis which threatens us all.
A. HISTORICAL REPORTS DOCUMENT CALFIRE’S INADEQUATE
GOVERNANCE
In 1994, the Little Hoover Commission identified problems plagu-
ing the forest resource management process,46 particularly in relation to
the lack of resources,47 undue focus on process rather than outcome,48
and a piecemeal approach to the evaluation of environmental impacts.49
The Commission concluded that the timber harvest plan process “has not
proven effective in achieving a sound balance between economic and
environmental concerns,” and “[r]esources and priorities are devoted to
issues of process rather than outcome.”50
A core complaint at the time was the failure to understand the im-
pact of logging in the larger ecosystem context.51  Considering only the
46 Terzian et al., supra note 11.
47 Id. at 23.
48 Id. at 49 (“people are more interested in dotting i’s and crossing t’s than in how effective
mitigation measures are.”).
49 Id. at 54.
50 Id. at 50.
51 Id. at 54 (A “major environmental complaint about the Timber Harvest Plan process is that
the plans are small snapshots of forests at a certain point in time rather than panoramic perspectives
that examine entire dynamic ecosystems over a long time span.”).
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individual logging plan and its area, without evaluating the potential for
impacts in a larger area, is both inefficient and ineffective.52  Thus,
the environment is not being effectively protected because the flawed
concept that the Timber Harvest Plan process is based on – namely
that ecology can be addressed on a parcel-by-parcel basis. In addition,
the State’s focus is almost entirely on procedural steps rather than on
the eventual outcome. As a result, what occurs in the real world may
have very little relationship to what is prescribed in a harvest plan, and
there is no mechanism for linking demonstrated effectiveness of miti-
gation measures to future policy directives.53
This failure has persisted.  Seven years later, in 2001, the University
of California Committee on Cumulative Watershed Effects issued a com-
prehensive report and recommendations, presenting a scientific basis to
compel evaluation of cumulative watershed effects resulting from log-
ging.54  Echoing the need to analyze impacts beyond a parcel-by-parcel
review, the Dunne Report agreed that Cumulative Watershed Effects
(“CWE”)55 cannot be evaluated through the isolated lens of individual
plans, even if well-intentioned.56  Forest watersheds are subject to the
water quality impacts of logging.  Logging operations can cause com-
bined effects on sediment, water temperature, in-channel volumes of or-
ganic debris, chemical contamination, the amount and physical nature of
aquatic habitat, and increases in peak discharges during storm run-off.57
Logging-generated sediment moves from the hillslopes to the intermit-
tent draws to the small creeks, and on to the main stem of a river.  To
assess the potential water quality impact from a given logging plan, one
must look at the entire watershed, both upstream and downstream, to
understand what is being put into the stream system.  And this spatial
analysis requires a time dimension to understand legacy conditions of the
52 Id. at 63 (Logging plans “cannot be fully effective in minimizing damage to the environ-
ment unless they address cumulative impacts across a broad area. Assessing those impacts on a plan-
by-plan basis is inefficient, costly and open to questions of credibility.”).
53 Id., Transmittal Letter, Chairman Richard R. Terzian, June 8, 1994.
54 Thomas Dunne et al., Univ. of Cal. Wildland Res. Ctr. Rep. No. 46, A Scientific Basis for
the Prediction of Cumulative Watershed Effects 1 (Richard B. Standiford & Rubyann Arcilla eds.,
2001).
55 Id. at 4-5 (“Cumulative Watershed Effects (“CWEs”) are significant, adverse influences on
water quality and biological resources that arise from the way watersheds function, and particularly
from the ways that disturbances within a watershed can be transmitted and magnified within chan-
nels and riparian habitats downstream of disturbed areas.”).
56 Id. at 3 (CWE “cannot be predicted through the existing parcel-by-parcel analysis for THP
applications, even if it were based on the best current understanding.”).
57 Id. at 13.
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stream system, what has been moving through the stream in the past, and
what may be move through the system in the future.58
The Dunne Report concluded that there is “excessive reliance on
rule-making rather than problem solving,” with a lack of real methodol-
ogy, little basis for enforcement, and “no procedures to show that CWEs
are an issue.”59  It found that Registered Professional Foresters (“RPFs”)
do not have adequate training to analyze CWE,60 and CalFire “does not
have regulators trained in the interdisciplinary fashion required to review
the analysis and prediction of CWEs.”61  The consequence is that “rarely,
if ever” in Northern California has a finding been made to limit proposed
logging based on CWEs.62  Accordingly, the Dunne Report recom-
mended that the responsibility for assessing and predicting CWEs be
taken out of the Timber Harvest Plan (and Sustained Yield Plan) Appli-
cations and given to a new unit of a State agency.”63  Dunne recom-
mended the State recruit and train CWE specialists, develop a specialized
certificate training for registered professional foresters, and manage pro-
fessionals to work with the State for CWE analyses.64
B. FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT RESPONSIVE LEGISLATION AND TAKE
EFFECTIVE ACTION FURTHER DOCUMENTS CALFIRE’S LACK
OF GOVERNANCE
These problems persist today without remedy, despite legislative ef-
forts to require standards and other agency authority.  In 2012, California
adopted Assembly Bill 1492 (“AB 1492”), to “promote and encourage
sustainable forest practices” consistent with the 1973 Forest Practice Act
and other laws governing logging.65  AB 1492 reiterated the public bene-
fit of California’s viable forest lands and their resources and the value of
“a thriving in-state forest products sector” as key to maintaining our for-
est lands.66  It authorized a sales tax on lumber products,67 as a means to
provide funding for effective resource management under the Forest
Practice Act and for restoration of timberlands, promoting protection of
58 See Wilson, R., Director CDF, CDF Comment, “California Watersheds – Natural Resource
and Community Integrators,” Aug. 1993.
59 Id. at 55.
60 Id. at 21.
61 Id. at 57.
62 Id. at 27.
63 Id. at 61.
64 Id. at 62-63.
65 Pub. Res. Code § 4629.2(a).
66 Pub. Res. Code § 4629.
67 Chapter 289, Pub. Res. Code § 4629.3 (2012).
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fisheries, wildlife habitat and water quality improvement.68  AB 1492
can be seen as a response, in part, to historical reports identifying the
need for adequate funding, outcome rather than process, cumulative im-
pacts standards, necessary training, and delegation of authority to an
agency other than CalFire.69
AB 1492 required CalFire’s parent agency, the California Natural
Resources Agency, as well as the California Environmental Protection
Agency to oversee and report on AB 1492 implementation and its Tim-
ber Regulation and Forest Restoration Program (“TRFRP”).70  These
agencies have developed the “California Timber Regulation and Envi-
ronment Evaluation System” (“CalTREES”) program for submission and
review of proposed timber harvesting plans for CalFire;71 after a pro-
posed logging plan is submitted, “staff from the [TRFRP] review it for
compliance with state regulations designed to ensure sustainable harvest-
ing practices and minimize environmental harms.”72
AB 1492 required changes to regulatory programs to include and
provide “incentives for best practices,” and development of standards or
strategies to protect natural resources and large-scale road management
and riparian function plans.73  AB 1492 “directs the TRFRP to develop
statewide ecological performance measures (“EPM”) approach as an ac-
countability measure for the multiple State programs that regulate timber
management on nonfederal forestlands.”74  Development of these mea-
sures is key to accomplishing the Legislature’s intent to ensure sustaina-
ble forest practices,75 as the development of the ecological performance
measures are to “evaluate the cumulative impacts of management and
68 Pub. Res. Code §§ 4692(a)-(c), 4629.6.
69 Terzian et al, supra note 11, at 23, 49, 50, 54, 63, Transmittal Letter; Dunne et al., supra
note 54, at 3-5, 13; Wilson, supra note 58, at 21, 27, 55, 57, 61.
70 California Natural Resources Agency, Forest Stewardship: The Timber Regulation and
Forest Restoration Program, RESOURCES.CA.GOV, https://resources.ca.gov/Initiatives/Forest-Steward
ship (“The major components of the [“TRFRP”] provide a funding stream via a one-percent assess-
ment on lumber and engineered wood products sold at the retail level, seek transparency and effi-
ciency improvements to the State’s timber harvest regulation programs, provide for development of
ecological performance measures, establish a forest restoration grant program, and require program
reporting to the Legislature.”).
71 California Timber Regulation and Environmental Evaluation System (“CalTREES”), Infor-
mation Portal, FIRE.CA.GOV, https://www.fire.ca.gov/programs/resource-management/forest-prac
tice/caltrees/ (“CalTREES is the online timber harvest permitting system that will streamline the
submission and review processes for timber harvesting documents.”).
72 Taylor, supra note 3, at 11; see Moreno, 2019, supra note 35, at 60 (“Currently there is
only one dedicated staff person from the [TRFRP] . . . assigned to developing the EPM program.”).
73 Pub. Res. Code § 4629.2 (H).
74 Cal. Natural Res. Agency, AB 1492 Development of Ecological Performance Measures for
California’s Nonfederal Timberlands, RESOURCES.CA.GOV, https://resources.ca.gov/Initiatives/For
est-Stewardship/epm.
75 Pub. Res. Code § 4629.9.
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harvesting activities on a larger scale and support more long-term goals
for minimizing the environmental impacts of such activities.”76  In sim-
ple terms, AB 1492 reiterates the Forest Practice Act directive to govern
our forests as ecosystems.
AB 1492 requires the Secretary of Natural Resources, as of January
10, 2013 and on each January 10 thereafter, to submit a written report to
the Legislature which outlines activities by all of the agencies relating to
forest and timberland regulation, and which includes, among other
things, “a set of measures for, and a plan for collection of data . . . (F)
Evaluating ecological performance.”77
Since the 2012 enactment of AB 1492, these provisions have not
been met — required ecological performance measures do not exist and
annual reports have not been submitted as required.  As of February 5,
2020, the most recent annual report was submitted three years ago, on
March 23, 2017.78  In that report, the agencies concede the impact of this
delay, stating “[d]evelopment and implementation of ecological perform-
ance measures is critical to determining the adequacy of the current regu-
latory programs at protecting the environment; until these are developed,
resources, and implemented, the ecological performance of timber re-
view programs cannot be well understood.”79
The 2017 annual report also disclosed that in FY 2015-2016, there
were only 1,098 active THPs covering 593,993 acres, compared to 4,187
exemption operations operating on more than 5.5 million acres.80  These
millions of acres of exemption operations are not subject to the agency
review and oversight, as required for regular logging plans under the
Forest Practice Act, resulting in an expansion of a huge governance
gap.81
In the absence of required annual reporting, in 2019 the Resources
Agency issued a White Paper presenting its methodology to decide on
ecological performance measures.82  It accepted the scientific consensus
that “extensive areas of California’s forested ecosystems are under ex-
treme pressure and stress given current and projected climate conditions,
increased impacts associated with agents of forest mortality (pests, dis-
76 Taylor, supra note 3, at 11.
77 Pub. Res. Code § 4629.9(a)(8)(F).
78 Cal. Natural. Res. Agency, Assembly Bill 1492 Timber Regulation and Forest Restoration
Fund Program Report, RESOURCES.CA.GOV, https://resources.ca.gov/CNRALegacyFiles/wp-content/
uploads/2014/07/AB-1492-2017-Annual-Report-to-Legislature-Final-3-23-2017.pdf (Mar. 23,
2017).
79 Id. at 41.
80 Id. at 69, Table 27.
81 E.g., Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 1038.
82 Moreno 2019, supra note 35.
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ease, fire), coupled with expanding human-caused disturbance and devel-
opment within and around forested landscapes.”83  As in 2017, the
agency conceded the need for a long-term forest ecosystem monitoring
and assessment program, admitting that there is no approach providing a
detailed evaluation of ecological performance of California’s forest man-
agement regulatory system.84  The agency also admitted that without sci-
entific ecological performance measures, “[i]t is unclear how timber and
ecosystem management regulations, combined with forest restoration
projects, are impacting forest ecosystem function across California’s
landscapes, and whether existing regulation policies and programs are
achieving their intended goals.”85  The agency promised presentation of
“final EPMs” at an October 2019 workshop.86  This did not happen — it
does not appear the workshop was held or that any final EPMs have been
presented.87  The ongoing failure to implement AB 1492 underscores the
failure to ensure healthy forests as required by the Forest Practice Act.
In addition, CalFire has not complied with recent 2018 legislation,
Assembly Bill 2889, intended to provide a more transparent process of
review for logging plans.88  This legislation requires CalFire to provide
clearly written guidance and assistance documents that explain the regu-
latory process, including (1) a list of all information required in a plan,
(2) a checklist that, if properly followed, would show the plan is accept-
able for filing, and (3) guidance to responsible agencies that rely on the
timber harvesting plan for their analysis under the California Environ-
mental Quality Act.89  To date, CalFire has not met these statutory
requirements.
C. THE FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH CURRENT DAY REGULATION OR
CREATE ADEQUATE REGULATION FURTHER ILLUSTRATES
CALFIRE’S LACK OF GOVERNANCE
Compounding a failure to provide critical standards for sustainable
forest practices as directed by AB 1492, and guidance for the regulatory
process, CalFire and its Board of Forestry and Fire Protection
83 Id. at 3.
84 Id. at 5.
85 Id. at 8.
86 Id. at 61, Table 8.
87 Cal. Natural Res. Agency, AB 1492 Development of Ecological Performance Measures for
California’s Nonfederal Timberlands, resources.ca.gov, https://resources.ca.gov/Initiatives/Forest-
Stewardship/epm.
88 Pub. Res. Code § 4592.5.
89 Pub. Res. Code § 4592(a)(2)-(b).
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(“Board”)90 have not taken effective regulatory action to fulfill the Forest
Practice Act’s promise to restore, enhance and maintain healthy forests.
This is illustrated by CalFire’s failure to prioritize its duty to ensure sus-
tainable forest practices and evaluation of cumulative impacts, both in
terms of following existing Forest Practice Act regulation and in the
ongoing failure by CalFire’s Board to adopt necessary regulations.91
First, CalFire is not following its existing regulations.  CalFire is
required, in evaluating proposed logging plans, to apply the principle that
“forest management on a specific ownership shall be the production or
maintenance of forests which are healthy and naturally diverse, with a
mixture of trees and under-story plants, in which trees are grown prima-
rily for the production of high quality timber products.92  A logging pro-
posal must meet specific objectives, to provide a balance between growth
and harvest over time, maintain functional wildlife habitat within the
planning watershed, retain or recruit late and diverse seral state habitat
components for wildlife concentrated in the watercourse and lake protec-
tion zones, and maintain growing stock, genetic diversity, and soil pro-
ductivity.93  In authorizing logging on private lands, CalFire must find
that the proposed logging shall provide “[silvicultural] systems and alter-
natives which achieve maximum sustained production of high quality
wood products.”94
One is hard-pressed to find real and on-the-ground application of
these criteria documented in CalFire’s approval of logging plans, or their
achievement in post-operations conditions of many industrial logging
sites.  The poor conditions of our forests, so many of which are dense
groupings of trees without varied age classes, illustrate this lack of com-
pliance to achieve healthy and naturally diverse forests, necessary to pro-
vide high quality wood products and protection of the environment.95
Second, CalFire is not adopting necessary regulation. In the face of
the irrefutable need to act now to try and ameliorate catastrophic climate
crisis consequences, CalFire, through its Board, has not developed regu-
latory standards to evaluate the significant and cumulative impacts from
logging operations on wildfire threat and contribution of greenhouse
gases.  CalFire continues to lack standards to analyze the potential for
logging to create wildfire conditions and contribute to further greenhouse
90 Pub. Res. Code § 730(a) (The Board of Forestry and Fire Protection is within CalFire).
91 Pub. Res. Code § 4551 (The Board is required to adopt the regulations to implement the
Forest Practice Act).
92 Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 897(b) (emphasis added).
93 Id.
94 Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 913 (“the RPF shall select [silvicultural] systems and alternatives
which achieve maximum sustained production of high quality timber products.”).
95 Taylor, supra note 3, at 18-20.
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gases into an already toxic climate atmosphere.  The Forest Practice Ac-
tion regulations identify several factors to be considered in any individ-
ual proposed logging plan, such as the silvicultural method, harvest
practice and erosion control, site preparation, water course and lake pro-
tection, hazard reduction, and wildlife protection.96  Yet, the regulations
do not have separate provision(s) requiring analysis of the potential for
the individual logging plan’s silvicultural method to create a fire prone
landscape,97 or to contribute greenhouse gases.
The Forest Practice Act regulations separately require consideration
of “cumulative impacts,”98 which “refer to two or more individual Ef-
fects which, when considered together, are considerable or which com-
pound or increase other environmental Impacts.”99  These regulations do
not mandate use of assessment criteria or compliance with standards; in-
stead they provide guidance factors which “can” be used.  The evaluation
of cumulative impacts is “based upon the methodology” described in
Board Technical Rule Addendum No. 2.100  That methodology is a
“framework for the assessment,” presented in an Appendix as “guide-
lines  for evaluating Cumulative Impacts,” with “factors, and methods
for analysis, that can be considered or used ”to determine the presence of
cumulative impacts.101  This does not compel necessary rigorous analysis
or provide critical standards and protection as called for by Dunne and
others.
For the GHG impacts analysis, the guidelines identify “options
[which] can be used” to assess “how forest management activities may
affect GHG sequestration and emission rates of forests through changes
to forest inventory, growth, yield, and mortality;” compliance with spe-
cific measures or standards is not required.102  Similarly, for “wildfire
risk and hazard,” the guidelines identify elements which “may be consid-
96 Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, ch. 4, subch. 4, 5 & 6, art. 3-7, 9.
97 Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, §§ 918, 938, 958 provide a few regulations for “fire protection,”
which concern what happens during a logging operation, such as the need for a burning permit,
warming fires, and access during logging operations. They are not about whether a particularly
logging operation can create fire-prone conditions into the future.
98 Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 898 (“Cumulative Impacts shall be assessed based upon the
methodology described in the Board Technical Rule Addendum Number 2, Forest Practice Cumula-
tive Impacts Assessment Process.”).
99 Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 912.9, Technical Rule Addendum No. 2 Cumulative Impacts
Assessment, “A. Introduction.”
100 Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 898.
101 Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 912.9, Technical Rule Addendum No. 2, Cumulative Impacts
Assessment, “A. Introduction”; Appendix Technical Rule Addendum No. 2 Cumulative Impacts
Assessment Guidelines (emphasis added).
102 Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 912.9, Appendix Technical Rule Addendum No. 2 Cumulative
Impacts Assessment Guidelines, “G. Greenhouse Gas (“GHG”) Impacts.” (emphasis added).
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ered in the assessment of potential Cumulative Impacts.”103  Addition-
ally, evaluation of wildfire risk and hazard is limited to the potential for
“forest fuel loading in the vicinity of residential dwellings and communi-
ties.”104  It does not require analysis of the potential for development of a
fire prone landscape as a consequence of the silviculture and harvesting
methods, in a given logging plan or across a landscape.
The reasons listed above further illustrate that CalFire’s governance
of private land logging fails to consider the forest as an ecosystem, ig-
nores the need to protect forest resources from the real impacts of climate
change, contributes to the degradation of forest habitat and environmen-
tal resources, and increases fire conflagration.
VI. GOVERNANCE OF FOREST RESOURCE MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS
BY A DIFFERENT AGENCY WILL RESTORE AND ADVANCE
CALIFORNIA’S COMMITMENT TO ACHIEVE HEALTHY
FORESTS
The need to have an agency, other than CalFire, dedicated to gov-
ernance of private land logging under the Forest Practice Act is not a
new idea.  In 1994, the Little Hoover Commission underscored that
CalFire’s review and approval process for logging plans was not protect-
ing the environment because it was limiting review to a parcel-by-parcel
basis and focusing on process, rather than on effective outcome.105  In
2001, the Dunne Report recommended removing CalFire from the role of
evaluating cumulative watershed effects.106  In 2012, the Legislature di-
minished CalFire’s role, placing development of the ecological perform-
ance measures in California’s Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection Agencies.107  In 2016, Kimberly Rodrigues, a departing mem-
ber of the Board of Forestry and an RPF with extensive skill and exper-
tise in natural resources, recommended that CalFire be relieved of its
governance duties.
“[T]he California Natural Resources Agency needs to assume the re-
sponsibility of verifying that the Forest Practice Rules are being im-
plemented to protect the public trust resources from negative
103 Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 912.9, Appendix Technical Rule Addendum No. 2 Cumulative
Impacts Assessment Guidelines, “H. Wildfire Risk and Hazard.” (emphasis added).
104 Id.
105 Terzian et al., supra note 11, at 54.
106 Dunne et al., supra note 55, at 61.
107 Pub. Res. Code § 4629.9; see also Forest Climate Action Team, supra note 13, at 45
(CalFire is only one of several agencies handling California’s Forest Carbon Plan; it is not a lead, but
only a member of the Forest Climate Action Team).
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cumulative impacts and that sustain resilient forests. This cannot be
accomplished within Cal Fire alone. It is a public trust responsibility
requiring interagency expertise and collaboration and the AB 1492
process provides an opportunity and a responsibility to ensure these
public trusts are maintained and protected.”108
And, in 2018, the Legislative Analyst Office stated that CalFire “is
not the best entity to oversee proactive forest health efforts,” based on
two concerns: (1) leaving CalFire in charge  interferes with the ability of
other agencies which also have a role in regulation forest health, and  (2)
CalFire’s focus on increasingly frequent and extreme fire throughout the
state likely prevents it from providing effective resource management
governance for logging and proactive forest health efforts.109  Accord-
ingly, the Legislative Analyst Office recommended that the California
Resources Agency, rather than CalFire, be designated “as the lead
agency to oversee proactive forest and watershed health.”110
The LAO is correct: CalFire cannot be both a resource management
agency and a fire agency.  Its record of ineffective governance precedes
it and CalFire does not have adequate funding for resource management.
Governance for healthy forests under the Forest Practice Act must not be
forced to compete with fire prevention and suppression.  CalFire has
made its choice, favoring economic interests over resource management.
It chooses to be a well-funded fire department, at the expense of our
forests and required governance, resulting in ecologically degraded for-
ests with severe fire conditions.
VII. OPTIONS FOR DEDICATING AND/OR CREATING A DIFFERENT
AGENCY TO GOVERN FOREST RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
There are multiple options available to remedy this lack of
governance.
Certainly, the Legislature could create a new agency, guaranteeing
adequate funding, sufficient staff, and foresters professionally trained in
wholistic forestry to govern our forests for resource conservation as di-
rected by California’s Forest Practice Act.  This would likely be a time-
consuming and potentially expensive option.
As the LAO recommended in 2018, the California Resources
Agency could assume direct governance of the Forest Practice Act.
108 Letter from Kimberly Rodrigues, RPF 2326, State Board of Forestry and Fire Protection
(“BOF”), to John Laird, (May 20, 2016) (on file with the Board of Forestry).
109 Taylor, supra note 3, at 28.
110 Id. at 33-34.
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However, the agency’s failure to proceed in a timely manner with the
implementation of AB 1492 calls into question its ability to oversee the
Forest Practice Act in a reliable and thorough manner.
In the early years, California’s forest resource management existed
in the Department of Conservation, as the Division of Forestry.  The mis-
sion of the Department of Conservation easily encompasses the promise
and pursuit of the Forest Practice Act; it “balances today’s needs with
tomorrow’s challenges and fosters intelligent, sustainable, and efficient
use of California’s energy, land, and mineral resources.”111  We believe
this offers the most direct path forward, as it returns forest stewardship to
an agency which embraces conservation.  This would go a long way in
restoring the Forest Practice Act mandate for healthy forests into the
future.
Regardless of what path, replacing CalFire will provide a separate
and independent agency with strengthened funding and personnel re-
sources consistent with the 2018 LAO and other recommendations.  This
will also free CalFire to be an excellent fire agency, without potential for
funding competition. Both services are of the utmost urgency.
VIII. CONCLUSION
There is a long record documenting CalFire’s inability to adequately
govern logging on private lands in California.  We live now with the
consequences of that inadequate governance as we see our forests de-
pleted, increasingly fire prone, and unable to provide communities with
the regional economies they once depended upon.
This is only exacerbated by the full force of climate change and
crisis which is upon us.  According to David Wallace-Wells, national
fellow at the New America foundation and a columnist and deputy editor
at New York magazine, writing about the climate crisis devastation we
have brought upon ourselves and the responsibility to act now, “[i]t is
worse, much worse, than you think. . . what happens, from here, will be
entirely our own doing.”112  The forest and fire prone conditions we face
today will only intensify if we do not attend now to the good governance
required by the Forest Practice Act.  We must not accept or consider the
current fire prone conditions as a “new normal.”  They are not normal
and are not what our Forest Practice Act promised: healthy forests, not
degraded forests.  The climate crisis is anything but normal — it is a
111 California Department of Conservation, Mission and Vision, CONSERVATION.CA.GOV,
https://www.conservation.ca.gov/index/Pages/About-Us/aboutUs_Vision_Mission.aspx.
112 David Wallace-Wells, The Uninhabitable Earth: Life After Warming 1, 33 (2019).
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catastrophe facilitated by us, in our time and our world: we must never
accept it as normal.
In the face of the growing body of evidence and this existential cri-
sis, CalFire has not implemented or paid heed to the repeated critiques
and recommendations, even though these instruct what is needed to ad-
dress current forestry challenges.113  We do not even have the  ecological
performance measures required by the Legislature in 2012, which are
imperative to provide forest resource protection.  Instead, as former
Board of Forestry member Kimberly Rodrigues reiterates, our forests are
captive to the “tensions between forestry as an integrated ecological sci-
ence and fire prevention and control.”114
It is time to remove that tension by removing CalFire from its gov-
erning roles of the Forest Practice Act.  It is time for this governance
change, to restore the Forest Practice Act to its rightful and intended
place — securing healthy forests for this and future generations.  With
ever increasing danger from the lack of good governance, we must re-
store the Forest Practice Act directives and cultivate a renewed sense of
citizenship in the social and natural resources of our forestlands.  Placing
Forest Practice Act governance in an agency other than CalFire takes one
huge step forward in accomplishing this restoration.
113 E.g., Rodrigues, supra note 108, at 2.
114 Id.
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